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LWN.net | All | [$] Securely suspending LUKS-encrypted disks |
September 2, 2026 12:50 PM * |
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When a laptop is asleep, its memory is not unreadable. The right tooling can attach to the computer's memory bus and read out its contents, and cold-boot attacks can theoretically read values from memory for a short time after the computer loses power. That is really an unavoidable fact about the hardware, but some users would still like to ensure that, even if this happens, their long-term encryption keys, such as the key for full-disk encryption, remain unreadable. In June�2026, Ingo Blechschmidt discovered that Linux kernel versions after 6.9 (released in May�2024) were not erasing disk-encryption keys when a laptop was put to sleep, even when configured to do so. He quickly identified a potential fix, which has been merged, but it was not a comprehensive solution. https://lwn.net/Articles/1090568/ --- SBBSecho 3.37-Linux * Origin: Palantir * palantirbbs.ddns.net * Pensacola, FL * (618:250/24) |
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